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State-Interest Analysis and the Channeling
Function in Privacy Law

Carl E. Schneider

Introduction

In this article, I wish to criticize the narrowness of the Supreme Court's
conception of the interests states may advance to justify statutes challenged
on constitutional privacy grounds. I also wish to identify and describe one
of the several state interests that not infrequently undergirds such legislation
but that the Court has failed to understand.
My argument must begin with some ideas I first advanced in an article
on "State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment 'Privacy' Law: An
Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social lssues." 1 There I observed that
while courts and commentators have lavished effort on the fundamentalrights side of privacy law, they have scanted the state-interest side, thereby
producing crucial weaknesses in that law. Some of these weaknesses are
doctrinal: The Supreme Court has neither articulated a standard to use in
Fourteenth Amendment privacy cases, adequately defined the terms (e.g.,
"necessary" and "compelling") of the standard it most often invokes, nor
effectively applied that standard to the relevant empirical questions. These
weaknesses bespeak "the Court's unwillingness or inability to decide what
it meant to do when it began to constitutionalize family law, the difficulties
of setting coherent yet reasonably simple and workable judicial policy in
an area as multifarious as family law and in a country as various as ours,
and the problems with assessing the desirability and effectiveness of legislation in family law."2
In addition, "the Court often looks at the challenged statute in isolation
from its legal and social context and often looks at the challenged statute
in isolation from other statutes and from other forms of social regulation." 3
Such laws may sometimes "be understood as attempting to influence behavior indirectly, by reinforcing in people attitudes that encourage restraint in
family and sexual settings. They may seek to induce what we might, loosely
97
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and perhaps hyperbolically, call 'ascetic' attitudes toward family and sexual
life."4 This "socializing strategy," while hardly obligatory social policy,
has substantial foundations in Western thought and should be considered
when courts evaluate state interests. Finally, I speculated that the laws reviewed in privacy cases may be "intended to help construct and sustain
social institutions for the conduct of sexual and family life,"5 institutions
that not only serve weighty social ends, but may even augment individual
autonomy.
In my earlier article, then, I argued that constitutional analysis in privacy law needs to see statutes in their full "legal and social context," to
appreciate the true complexity of the world. 6 And I argued that the socializing strategy is sometimes part of that context and complexity. Here, I assess
another such element by examining the law's work in recruiting, building,
shaping, and sustaining social institutions. Briefly, I suggest that that
work-which I call the "channeling function"-may be part of a state's
interest in statutes challenged on privacy grounds. 7 I do not argue that the
channeling function will always be present or that it must always prevail.
I do argue that it is an often ignored but sometimes legitimate aspect of
a statute's goals and a state's interests.
My purpose here may be explained somewhat differently. The right
of privacy is "fundamental." Courts and commentators accord it notable
power, for it vanquishes all but those "compelling" state interests to whose
service a statute is "necessary." Few interests attain the beatitude of compulsion or necessity. Reading some opinions, one wonders how any statute
could survive. Virtually all family law (the area most often at issue in
privacy cases) seems at risk. 8 How has it endured? A clue may lie in a
lurking, inarticulate judicial intuition that there is more to the state's interests than the Court has yet acknowledged, that those interests are subtler,
richer, and hardier than the Court's formulas can recognize. This article
seeks to confirm that intuition by restoring one more piece to the neglected
mosaic of state interests.
My exploration of this topic will have several stages. First, I will
define what I mean by "channeling function" and suggest that, rightly or
wrongly, it has played a weighty role in family law and is thus sometimes
part of the interests a state promotes through its statute law. In the second
stage of my paper I will examine some of the factors that constrain the
channeling function's effectiveness and may make it more vulnerable to
constitutional attack. I will try to show that the function's power is limited,
that that power may be used both wisely and foolishly, and that its use
imposes costs. Finally, I will seek to make my discussion of the channeling
function as a state interest more concrete by exploring a recent case
(Michael H. v. Gerald D.) in channeling terms.
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Finally, a word about this article's scope. One might ask two basic
questions about the channeling function. First, is its use wise social policy?
Second, may it properly be adduced as a state interest to justify a law
challenged on privacy grounds? I address only the second question and
leave the former to another time and place.
The Theory of the Channeling Function
What Is the Channeling Function?

Family law has, I think, five functions. 9 The first is the protective function.
One of law's most basic duties is to protect citizens against harms done
to them by other citizens. This means protecting people from physical harm,
as the law of spouse and child abuse attempts to do, and from nonphysical
harms, especially economic wrongs and psychological injuries. 10 Law's second function is to help people organize their lives and affairs in the ways
they prefer. Family law performs this "facilitative" function by offering
people the law's services in entering and enforcing contracts, by giving
legal effect to their private arrangements. Family law's third function is
to help people resolve disputes. The law of divorce exemplifies family
law's "arbitral" function, since today's divorce courts primarily adjudicate
conflicting claims to marital property, alimony, and child custody.
Instinct in each of these first three functions of family law lies a
relatively commonplace idea: There are people (particularly children) the
law is widely expected to protect, contracts it is widely expected to facilitate, and disputes it is widely expected to arbitrate. However, the last two
functions of family law are less self-evident and more controversial. The
first of these is the expressive function. It works by deploying the law's
power to impart ideas through words · and symbols. It has two (related)
aspects: Law's expressive abilities may be used (first) to provide a voice
in which citizens may speak and (second) to alter the behavior of people
the law addresses. 11 The ERA exemplifies both aspects. Its proponents had
(among other things) two kinds of expressive purposes in mind. They proposed it partly because they wanted the law of their country-their law-to
make a symbolic statement about the relationship between men and women.
And they also believed that such symbolic statements can promote changes
in social sentiment that in turn may promote a reformation of social behavior.
Finally, in the channeling function the law creates or (more often)
supports social institutions that are thought to serve desirable ends. "Social
institution" I intend broadly: "In its formal sociological definition, an institution is a pattern of expected action of individuals or groups enforced by
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social sanctions, both positive and negative." 12 Social institutions arise, Berger and Ludemann tell us, "whenever there is a reciprocal typification of
habitualized actions by types of actors." 13 Generally, the channeling function
does not require that people use these social institutions, although it may
offer incentives and disincentives for their use. Primarily, rather, it is their
very presence, the social currency they have, and the governmental support
they receive that combine to make it seem reasonable and even natural for
people to use them. Thus people can be said to be channeled into them.
As Berger and Luckmann write, "Institutions ... , by the very fact of their
existence, control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions
that would theoretically be possible." 14 Or as James Fitzjames Stephen wrote
with characteristic vividness, "The life of the great mass of men, to a great
extent the life of all men, is like a watercourse guided this way or that
by a system of dams, sluices, weirs, and embankments .... [I]t is by these
works, that is to say, by their various customs and institutions-that men's
lives are regulated." 15
Business law offers usefully clear examples of such institutions. People
have long united to invest in and run businesses. To encourage such activity,
governments give legal recognition to a particular business form-the corporation. They also endow it with special advantages-particularly, limited
liability and unlimited life. By now, this form has become familiar, natural,
and comfortable. It is habitualized, it is institutionalized.
I have used the example of business institutions because the law's
role in forming and supporting them and channeling people into them is
particularly evident. In addition, it is probably easier for us to appreciate
the channeling function in the relatively uncontroversial context of business
life. But with what institutions have statutes challenged under "privacy"
rubrics been concerned? Here we encounter some difficulty. It must always
be hard to define any social institution. "Society" has no voice in which
to identify and describe its institutions. Lawmakers do not always speak
explicitly and exactly about social institutions, even though they may be
much concerned for them. Different people would define the same institution in different ways, and the same institution will affect different people
differently. What is more, institutional patterns in a modern society will
necessarily be elaborately complex: Any institution will have both normative and behavioral aspects, and behavior within institutions will rarely live
up to the institution's normative aspirations. One institution may take many
forms, forms that can, further, vary from place to place and can change
over time. A single institution can serve competing functions. 16 Few if any
institutions will be unambivalently and unambiguously embraced, and the
multiplicity of social goals may interfere with the nurture of the most
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warmly embraced institution. An institution may encounter competing and
even conflicting institutions. 17 And, worse, there is a sense in which institutions do not "exist," but are merely analytic constructs. 18
None of this, however, makes it pointless to talk about social institutions. Institutions may be analytic constructs, but those constructs can still
be useful attempts to describe patterns of attitudes and behavior. That those
patterns will always be complex and those attempts will always be imprecise
does not mean that the patterns are not there or that the attempts will be
useless.
One other point about the channeling function needs to be made before
we explore specific examples of its use in state-interest analysis. In one
important (if limited) sense, the channeling function is normatively neutral:
It can be employed to serve all kinds of normative ends. It has been put
to many uses; it could be put to many more. Central to any evaluation of
a specific example of the channeling function will be an assessment of the
particular goals to which it has been put. To illustrate the workings of the
function in privacy cases, I have selected two institutions that I think the
law can plausibly be said to use in channeling terms. But there are certainly
other ways in which the channeling function has been deployed in family
law, and there may well be ways in which it would be better deployed.
Having acknowledged the difficulty and asserted the importance of
my enterprise, I will now try to describe two broad social institutions that
a state could regard as objects of the channeling function. 19 These two
institutions are "marriage" and "parenthood." These are, obviously, quite
broadly defined institutions, and my descriptions of them are thus subject
to all the difficulties I described above. I have no doubt that both these
institutions have somewhat different meanings for different people, that
they have changed over time and are still changing, and that they do not
monopolize intimate life in modem America. However, a state defending
a statute against constitutional attack might plausibly identify a core of
ideas that have enough social support to justify the term "institution" and
that the state might conclude the law should try to support, to shape, and
to channel people into.
A state might, then, posit a normative model of "marriage" with several
fundamental characteristics. It is monogamous, heterosexual, and permanent.
It rests on love. Husbands and wives are to treat each other affectionately,
considerately, and fairly. They should be animated by mutual concern and
willing to sacrifice for each other. In short, they ought to assent to the old
question: "Wilt thou love her, comfort her, honour, and keep her in sickness
and in health; and, forsaking all others, keep thee only unto her, so long
as ye both shall live?" 20
Of course, as Karl Llewellyn warned, too much can be "thought and
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written as if we had a pattern of ways that ma[k]e up marriage." 21 Of
course, as Llewellyn knew, "'The' norm is none too uniform."22 But as
he also knew, "major features are observed, are 'recognized,' are made the
measure of the 'right.' Right in such matters is most powerfully felt: these
are compacted patterns, backed by unreasoning tradition, built around interests that lie deep and close."23
In the same way, a state might posit an institution of "parenthood"
with several key normative characteristics. Parents should be married to
each other. They are preferably the biological father and mother of their
child. They have authority over their children and can make decisions for
them. However, like spouses, parents are expected to love their children
and to be affectionate, considerate, and fair. They should support and nurture
their children during their minority. They should assure them a stable home,
particularly by staying married to each other, so that the child lives with
both parents and knows the comforts of security.
Obviously, these two normative models are not and never were descriptions of any universal empirical reality, and I will soon examine recent
changes in social practice that might affect them. Nor are they the only
models the channeling function might be recruited to serve. Nevertheless,
they do describe ideals that have won substantial allegiance in American
life and law. I will thus use these models to illustrate how the channeling
function can work. How, then, might a state argue that its law supports
these two institutions and channels people into them?
A state might see family law as setting a framework of rules one of
whose effects is to shape, sponsor, and sustain the model of marriage I
described above: It writes standards for entry into marriage, standards that
prohibit polygamous, incestuous, and homosexual unions. It seeks to encourage marital stability by inhibiting divorce (although it seeks this goal
much less vigorously than it once did). It tries to improve marital behavior
both directly and indirectly: It imposes a few direct obligations during
marriage, like the duty of support. Less directly, it has invented special
categories of property (like tenancies by the entirety and rights of dower
and curtesy) to reflect and reinforce the special relationship of marriage.
It indirectly sets some standards for marital behavior through the law of
divorce. Fault-based divorce does so by describing behavior so egregious
that it justifies divorce. Marital-property law implicitly sets standards for
the financial conduct of spouses. Finally, prohibitions against nonmarital
sexual activity and against quasi-marital arrangements in principle confine
sexual life to marriage. "What is all this," James Fitzjames Stephen emphatically asked, "except the expression of the strongest possible determination
on the part of the Legislature to recognize, maintain, and favour marriage
in every possible manner as the foundation of civilized society?"24
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Similarly, a state might argue that a framework of laws molds and
promotes the institution of parenthood. Laws criminalizing fornication, cohabitation, adultery, and bigamy in principle limit parenthood to married
couples, and those legal disadvantages that still attach to illegitimacy make
it wise to confine parenthood to marriage. Laws restricting divorce make
it likelier that a child would be raised by both parents. The law buttresses
parents' authority over children. Parents may use reasonable force in disciplining their children. They may decide whether their children should have
medical treatment. They may choose their child's school. Parents of "children in need of supervision" can summon up the state's coercive power.
However, the law also tries, directly and indirectly, to shape parental behavior. It requires parents to support their children. It penalizes the "abuse"
or "neglect" of children and obliges many kinds of people to report evidence
of it. It makes parents send their children to school. Custody law obliquely
sets standards for parental behavior and emphasizes the primacy of children's interests. Finally, some states further elaborate the relationship between parent and child by obliging adult children to support their indigent
parents.
This sketch suggests how the law can be seen as performing the first
task of the channeling function, namely, to create-or more often, to recruit-social institutions and to mold and sustain them. The function's second task is to channel people into institutions. It can perform these two
tasks in several ways. First, it does so simply by recognizing and endorsing
institutions, thus giving them some aura of legitimacy and permanence.
Recognition may be extended, for instance, through formalized, routinized,
and regulated entry and exit to an institution, as with marriage: "By the
authority vested in me by the State of Michigan, I now pronounce you
man and wife."
A second channeling technique is to reward participation in an institution. Tax law, for instance, may offer advantages-like the marital deduction-to married couples that it denies the unmarried. Similarly, Social
Security offers spouses benefits it refuses lovers. These advantages are enhanced when private entities consult the legal institution in allocating
benefits, as when private employers offer medical insurance only to "family
members" as the law defines that term. In a somewhat different vein, the
law of alimony and marital property offers spouses-but generally not "cohabitants"-protections on divorce.
Third, the law can channel by disfavoring competing institutions.
Sometimes competitors are flatly outlawed, as by laws prohibiting sodomy,
bigamy, adultery, and prostitution. Bans on fornication and cohabitation
mean (in principle) that, to have sexual relations, one must marry. Sometimes competing institutions are merely disadvantaged. For instance, the
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rule making contracts for meretricious consideration unenforceable traditionally denied unmarried couples the law's help in resolving some disputes.
Similarly, nonparents are presumptively disadvantaged in custody disputes
with parents. 25 Finally, restrictive divorce laws impede reentry to the alternative institution of singleness.
Fourth, in principle people can be channeled into an institution by
directly penalizing its nonuse. One might, for instance, say that school
taxes penalize childlessness, since nonparents get a good deal less out of
those taxes than parents. However, the weakness of this example suggests
the difficulty of finding really good instances in American law of direct
penalties for not marrying or not having children.
By and large, then, the channeling function does not primarily use
direct legal coercion. People are not forced to marry. One can contract out
(formally or informally) of many of the rules underlying marriage. One
need not have children, and one is not forced to treat them lovingly. Rather,
the function forms and reinforces institutions that have significant social
support and that, optimally, come to seem so natural that people use them
almost unreflectively. It relies centrally but not exclusively on social approval of the institution, on social rewards for its use, and on social disfavor
of its alternatives. Some aspects of it may be highly legalized, as divorce
is. Some alternatives may, at least formally, be legally prohibited. The law
may buttress an institution here and harry its competitors there. But, Berger
and Luckmann explain, "(T]he primary social control is given in the existence of an institution as such .... Additional control mechanisms are required only insofar as the processes of institutionalization are less than
completely successful."26 They suggest "institutions are there, external to
[the individual], persistent in their reality .... They have coercive power
over him, both in themselves, by the sheer force of their facticity, and
through the control mechanisms that are usually attached to the most important of them."27 And as Llewellyn, thinking more particularly about marriage, wrote, "One vital element in the fact-pattern thus made right is (this
needs repetition) its recognition by the group .... [O]nce conceived, once
accepted, the over-simple norm-concept maintains itself stubbornly, despite
all changes in conditions; it becomes the socially given, right, ideal-type
of 'marriage': the connubium honestum of the vir honestus." 28 Channeling's
reliance on social institutions, then, is both its strength and its weakness.
What Purposes Does the Channeling Function Serve?

The channeling function, I have said, fosters social institutions and channels
people into them. But why might the state want to do so? To answer that
question, let us revisit the example of the corporation as a "channeling"
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institution. First, the corporation serves law's three core functions. For example, it serves the protective function by allowing people to invest in
enterprises without risking their whole fortunes, by protecting minority
shareholders, and by directing economic activity into an institution whose
public nature makes it easier to regulate. The corporation serves the facilitative function by giving people a convenient and efficient way of organizing
themselves into enterprises. It serves the arbitral function by providing
mechanisms for resolving disputes among entrepreneurs and for winding
up their affairs.
But the corporate form does more than promote law's core functions.
More centrally and obviously, it serves some broad social purposes. Primarily, it promotes the accumulation of large agglomerations of capital and
the organization of many people into a single enterprise. In other words,
the corporate form makes possible the extensive and complex economic
institutions on which rest industrialization, social wealth, and modernity.
Less grandly, more specifically, and more subtly, the corporation serves
what might be called "efficiency" functions. For instance, it relieves prospective entrepreneurs of the need to figure out de novo how to organize
their venture. Much of that work will already have been done by earlier
generations and been embodied in the corporate form and in the law, literature, and lore that surround it. Because that form is neither monolithic nor
exclusive, entrepreneurs will have important choices to make (and considerable flexibility). But the energy they must expend is diminished by the
menu of well-developed standard alternatives among which to choose.
In addition, the corporate form makes the world more predictable for
everyone. When investors, regulators, employees, creditors, debtors, vendors, and customers encounter a corporation, they essentially know how it
is organized and what it can and cannot do. A creditor, for example, realizes
that, unlike a partnership, a corporation's liability is limited to its own
assets. And so on. Because people have established expectations about corporations they need expend less effort to understand an enterprise. This
not only saves them time and trouble, but may make them more willing
to join in or deal with the enterprise. In short, both the corporation and
those who deal with it benefit from the existence of a well-known, timetested, socially accepted, and governmentally supported economic institution.
Similarly, family law's channeling function is partly a specialized way
of performing its protective, facilitative, and arbitral functions. For instance,
marriage variously serves the protective function. Law does not just (in
conjunction with other social forces) create a shell of an institution; it
builds (again with much help) institutions with norms. The institution of
marriage that the law recruits and shapes attempts to induce in spouses a
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sense of an obligation to treat each other well-to love and honor each
other. At the elemental level of physical violence, the law has tried to
reinforce this socially imposed obligation by making cruelty a ground for
divorce, by taking cruelty into account in settling the spouses' economic
affairs, and by criminalizing and (increasingly aggressively in some jurisdictions) prosecuting spouse abuse. At the level of economic life, the law has
(at least nominally) supervised the fairness of antenuptial agreements and
the distribution of the spouses' assets on divorce. And marriage protects
children by making it likelier that both parents will care for them throughout
their minority. 29
The channeling function also assists the facilitative function. The latter
function furnishes people mechanisms that help them organize their lives
and affairs as they wish. Family law's institutions offer people models for
organizing their lives. These models have been developed over time and
have presumably worked for many other people. They become part of a
menu of social choice. Further, marriage offers people a kind of relationship
with social and legal advantages that are primarily available precisely because the law gives marriage a special status. Finally, marriage serves the
dispute-resolution function by providing rules and a forum in which to
adjudicate the disputes that flock around divorce like remoras around a
shark. In addition, it provides norms of behavior that may help the parties
resolve some of their disputes privately.
But the channeling function is more than a specialized means of performing law's other functions. Like the corporation, marriage and parenthood serve some broad social purposes. These are crucial, but they are
also so familiar they hardly need elaboration. Sixty years ago Karl Llewellyn
discerned twelve such purposes in marriage. They included the regulation
of sexual behavior, the reduction of sexual conflict, the orderly perpetuation
of the species, the "building and reinforcement of an economic unit," the
regulation of wealth, and the "development of individual personality."30
And a large body of writing argues that the present happiness and future
well-being of children depend on their growing up in something like the
kind of institution I described above. 31
Less grandly, more specifically, and more interestingly, the institutions
of the family also serve what I earlier called "efficiency" functions (but
that might in this warmer context be called ways of easing social life).
First, channeling's institutions spare people having to invent the forms of
family life de novo. Imagine two nineteen-year-olds living in a state of
nature who find themselves in love. Without established social institutions,
they would have to work out afresh how to express that love, how to
structure their relationship, and what to expect of each other. The same
couple in, say, the United States of the mid-twentieth century would find
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a set of answers to those questions in the institution of marriage. To be
sure, they would see other answers presented by other institutions. They
would hear criticisms of marriage. They would not be compelled to marry.
But, marriage would seem natural to them because most of the adults they
knew partook of it, because society and the law supported it, and because
they had to some extent internalized its values. As one sociologist remarks,
"When people make decisions, they tend to look not to a mathematical
formula to determine what is to their best advantage, but to what others
do, to what they have traditionally done, or to what they think others think
they ought to do." 32 The institution, that is, would be part of a comfortable
social vocabulary, a vocabulary that would save our lovers from having
to invent their own language.
In short, as Berger and Luckmann observe, "Habitualization carries
with it the important psychological gain that choices are narrowed." 33 As
Whitehead memorably put it,
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and
by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should
cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of
important operations which we can perform without thinking about
them. Operations of thought are likely cavalry charges in a battle-they
are strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must
only be made at decisive moments. 34
Of course, this is not to say that cavalry charges are never necessary, that
operations of thought are always to be avoided. Quite the contrary. As
Berger and Luckmann note, "[B]y providing a stable background in which
human activity may proceed with a minimum of decision-making most of
the time, [habitualization] frees energy for such decisions as may be necessary on certain occasions. In other words, the background of habitualized
activity opens up a foreground for deliberation and innovation." 35
The channeling function does not just relieve people of the burden
of working out afresh how to organize their lives. Even if one could satisfactorily invent modes of living for oneself, they probably could not be lived
alone but would have to be lived with others. People need to understand
and predict what other people think and do so that they can readily and
safely deal and cooperate with each other. Social institutions help serve
that need. As Martin Krygier writes, "There are many social situations
where our decisions are strategically interdependent [with the decisions of
other people. l]n such situations, norms will be generated which provide
'some anchorage; some preeminently conspicuous indication as to what
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action is likely to be taken by (most of) the others.' " 36 Social institutions
and the norms they embody, then, help us count on, cope with, and cooperate with other people.
More concretely, for example, the institution of marriage helps people
to plan for the future even before becoming engaged and to reach easier
understandings with their fiances and spouses about their married lives.
People dealing with married couples benefit as well. Mundanely, they know
that when they say, "Can you come for dinner on the sixteenth?" the invitation will be taken as including both husband and wife. Less banally and
more consequentially, a wedding ring warns anyone attracted to its wearer
not to contemplate an intimate relationship.
The kind of "anchorage" of which Krygier speaks may in fact be
particularly important in family relationships, for in the complex and longterm intimate relationships that characterize family life reliance and trust
are specially needed. A central source of that reliance and trust is of course
a faith in the love and steadfastness of one's family members. But that
faith may be more comfortably sustained, and reciprocating love more easily
given, where personal feelings are reinforced (and known to be reinforced)
by social institutions. As Norval Glenn suggests, even people "who still
strongly adhere to the ideal of marital permanence may be afraid to commit
strongly to their marriages if they perceive a general weakening of the
ideal."37
The advantages of institutions in family life are illuminated by situations in which institutions are absent. Andrew Cherlin, for instance, describes the difficulties for remarried adults and their children whose "day
to day life includes many problems for which there are no institutionalized
solutions. These problems can range from deciding what a stepchild should
call his or her stepparent, to resolving the sexual tensions that can emerge
between step-relatives in the absence of a well-defined incest taboo, to
defining the financial obligations of husbands to their spouses and children
from current and previous marriages." 38 Nor are these institutional weaknesses easily overcome. David Chambers writes that "the relationship between many stepparents and stepchildren remains unclear and uncomfortable
well beyond the initial stages." 39 Indeed, Cherlin argues that "the higher
divorce rate for remarriages after divorce is a consequence of the incomplete
institutionalization of remarriage after divorce in our society."40 He notes
that because institutionalized solutions for the special problems of reconstituted families have not emerged, "there is more opportunity for disagreements and divisions among family members and more strain in many remarriages after divorce."41
We can summarize these workings of the channeling function by imagining two people looking for recreation, who live in a world without tennis,
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and who are given three balls, two rackets, and one net. They could no
doubt find some way of amusing themselves with these toys. But tennis
is a good game partly because it developed over many centuries, and our
couple could not easily invent as good a game. Further, where tennis is a
social institution, the two will readily find people with whom to enjoy
their recreation, to improve their game, to relish their successes, and to
lament their failures. And part of the pleasure of tennis lies in knowing its
past glories and following its current progress. Tennis, in other words,
succeeds because it is a shared and well-established social institution. Marriage and parenthood benefit from that same fact.
Let me conclude what I have said in this section by calling again on
Karl Llewellyn, who wrote,
Such are the functions of the social institution, in our civilization.
Little about the set-up is inevitable. Costs which go here unnoted are
bitterly high. In no point is the institution adequate in performance,
nor is it always the major factor in such performance as obtains. Any
one of the functions could be, at some time or place has been, is now
in part, served powerfully in other ways. Few indeed are the cases in
which marriage alone is halfway adequate to any of them .... But
would one for that deny vitality to the work ... which marriage does?42
Some Limitations of the Channeling Function

So far in this study, we have examined the way the channeling function
works and the purposes it serves. We now need to explore the channeling
function's limitations. We will thus ask what factors may constrain the
function's utility and what costs its use may impose.
Before beginning this investigation of the channeling function's limits,
however, I must stress that I have not argued that every invocation of the
channeling function should suffice to justify a challenged statute. The function's appropriateness and efficacy will vary from case to case. Sometimes,
it may be directly implicated and reasonably effective. In other cases, a
statute may contribute little to channeling or may channel ineffectively.
Indeed, I would argue that the function's overall constitutional status
cannot be established with precision. This is primarily because of weaknesses in the structure of state-interest analysis as the Court has practiced
it. First, as I suggested in my earlier article, the Court has not taken its
own formulas very seriously. (And those formulas may well change as the
Court continues its reexamination of the privacy doctrine.) Second, as I
also argued in my earlier article, those formulae are in any event clumsy
and unhelpful. Third, both my prior article and this one rest partly on a
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skepticism that the Constitution contains the privacy right the Court has
discovered in it. In my earlier article, this skepticism freed me to suggest
that constitutionalizing social issues requires courts to make some kinds
of social decisions that they are poorly equipped to handle. At least without
more helpful guidance from the Constitution, evaluating the channeling
function seems to me such a decision.
In short, it seems to me more useful to study the channeling function
than to struggle across the arid desert of the Court's state-interest analysis
(although studying it should assist any such journey). I will therefore turn
now to an investigation of the channeling function's limitations.
One limitation on the channeling function is that the state can rarely
create a social institution de novo. Thus the channeling function can usually
be deployed successfully only where an institution already exists. Nor can
the state always bend an available institution to its purpose: As James
Fitzjames Stephen said, "Legislation ought in all cases to be graduated to
the existing level of morals in the time and country in which it is employed .... Law cannot be better than the nation in which it exists, though
it may and can protect an acknowledged moral standard, and may gradually
be increased in strictness as the standard rises. "43 Furthermore, channeling
primarily works, as I have said, obliquely and interstitially. That is, it does
not set all the terms of behavior within an institution but rather creates a
system of incentives and disincentives that touch participants only in places,
not globally. Even those incentives may operate so softly that many people
are quite unaware of or indifferent to them. 44 In short, because channeling
often uses only indirect and moderate force, because it leaves so much to
individual choice and to social rather than legal pressure, its power and
utility are limited.
In the last few decades, family law has been transformed, 45 and perhaps
the family has too. It is often said that families increasingly live in nontraditional arrangements and that even when they don't their internal relations
have vitally changed. Arland Thornton, for instance, sees a "decreased emphasis upon conformity to a set of behavioral standards in the family arena
and an increased emphasis on individual freedom." 46 In recent decades,
more specifically, the divorce rate has risen impressively. There are more
unmarried cohabitants. Nonmarital sexual activity has increased. Homosexuality has lost some of its stigma. Single parents are more numerous. More
broadly, one hears that "[f]amily groups are becoming internally deinstitutionalized, that is, their individual members are more autonomous and less
bound by the group[,] and the domestic group as a whole is less cohesive .... Examples of this are the decline of economic interdependence between husband and wife and the weakening of parental authority over
children."47 Are these changes so extensive that the family has become
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"deinstitutionalized"? Has it grown unreasonable to speak of the family in
terms of social institutions? Has the channeling function thus been put out
of business in family law?
Certainly family law has changed. "No-fault" divorce is now everywhere available, which both makes it easier to leave marriages and inhibits
setting norms for marital behavior. Prohibitions on nonmarital sexual activity have largely been repealed, found unconstitutional, or fallen into desuetude. Laws disadvantaging illegitimate children have yielded to dissatisfied
legislatures and courts. There has been some (partial) movement toward
the "atomizing" of family law, toward seeing people not as family members,
but rather as individuals dealing with other individuals. 48 As Justice Brennan
wrote in a telling and often retold phrase, "[l]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free ...
to bear or beget a child."49 By 1989, Justice Brennan could cite a string
of cases he believed indicated that "we have declined to respect a State's
notion, as manifested in its allocation of privileges and burdens, of what
the family should be."50
One noteworthy feature of recent legal change is the occasional governmental recognition of "functional equivalents" of the family. Perhaps the
best-known instance is Marvin v. Marvin. 51 There, the California Supreme
Court invited cohabitants to arrange their affairs contractually and to invoke
a broad set of equitable doctrines. 52 Marvin may thus have given cohabitants
marriagelike protections. Braschi v. Stahl Associates53 held that a homosexual couple could be a "family" within the meaning of the New York City
Rent and Eviction Regulations. 54 In Moore v. East Cleveland, the United
States Supreme Court decided that a grandmother living with a son and
two grandchildren, one of whom was not the resident son's child, were a
"family" for purposes of a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance.55
And in Smith v. OFFER, the Court intimated that people employed by the
state as foster parents might acquire a "parental" interest in their foster
children strong enough to give them some of the constitutional rights of
natural parents. 56 To like effect are the occasional "domestic partner" ordinances and regulations that seek to give spouselike benefits to unmarried
cohabitants. 57
Can the channeling function have any role in our changed new world?
I believe so. I suspect that the larger purposes the channeling function
serves are still important, even if the specific institutions the function promotes may be altered somewhat. But in order to build an a fortiori case,
let me revert to the two institutions I have used as examples-marriage
and parenthood. I will readily grant that these institutions may well have
changed in recent decades. But I will suggest reasons to doubt that even
in the rather traditional terms in which I have described those institutions,
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they can be dismissed as objects of the channeling function. Much less,
then, can it be said that the family has been so thoroughly deinstitutionalized
that the channeling function itself has become irrelevant.
First, the world may not have changed quite so much and so simply
as people-and courts-sometimes seem, rather casually, to assume. Social
change is not often as monolithic and complete as we perceive it to be.
For example, as early as 1964, that barometer of the conventional wisdomthe cover of Time magazine-announced that America had undergone a
"sexual revolution."58 This revolution was widely taken as having the most
thoroughgoing proportions. But one particularly extensive and careful study
of sexual attitudes conducted as late as 1970 concluded: "We have doubts
that such a revolution occurred."59 That study's data demonstrated
one striking fact: with regard to many forms of sexual expression,
our respondents were extremely conservative .... A majority disapproved of homosexuality, prostitution, extramarital sex, and most forms
of premarital sex .... Furthermore, except for masturbation and for premarital sex between people who are in love, our data suggest that a
majority of Americans are "moral absolutists" in that they see these
behaviors as always wrong. 60
A more recent student concluded that the changes in sexual attitudes over
the last several decades
hardly amount to a Sexual Revolution. They are both smaller and
more nuanced than aptly fits a revolutionary characterization .... Notable increases in approval of premarital sex (including cohabitation), sex education, and birth control did occur over the last
generation. However, at least since the early 1970s there appears to
have been no liberal shift, and even some conservative movement, in
attitudes on homosexuality, extra-marital sex, and pornography.61
Or take another example of the excessive simplicity of our impressions
of social change. People commonly assume that "the family" is in a state
of collapse, or at least lamentable disrepair. Yet, as David Popenoe notes,
the "current view of many leading sociologists [is] that the family has not
declined."62 Thus a recent contribution to the Middletown project looked
at changes from the 1920s to the 1970s and "discovered increased family
solidarity, a smaller generation gap, closer marital communication, more
religion, and less mobility."63
I am not arguing that society has not changed. Rather, I am suggesting
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that we should be much more cautious than we usually are in approaching
claims of radical social change and much more alive to the complexity of
social life. For one thing, data are absurdly hard to acquire and analyze. 64
For another, social change is too often "proved" by arguments that the
number of people doing something has increased by a large percentage.
But the size of the percentage may be misleading where, as often happens,
only a few people were involved at the first point in time. 65 For yet another
thing, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish short-term trends from
genuine secular change. Further, impressions of social change are easily
distorted. Both journalists and scholars, for instance, are more beguiled
by the thrilling heterodox than the boring orthodox.66 And, for instance,
we too easily see the behavior of our own class as typical of the country
at large. 67
Even if social behavior has changed dramatically, social norms may
not have. Even if, for example, families less often consist of a married
couple and their biological offspring, that grouping may still represent a
powerful cultural norm. Or, to take another example, it is often observed
that "[m]ost divorced people remarry, usually soon after their divorces,
suggesting that their divorce experience could be interpreted more as dissatisfaction with a specific spouse than as rejection of marriage as an institution."68 Further, many of the specific norms respecting marriage and parenthood could change without destroying the core institutional principles that
I described earlier. I am not suggesting that there have been no changes
in social attitudes about the family. But it seems to me quite possible that
the social institutions I described earlier may still retain the social strength
necessary to the channeling function even if they have changed in some
respects and are statistically less common. 69
Even if social behavior and social norms are changing, will they continue to do so? Might they even reverse their course? As I once wrote,
our views are "skewed by the unexamined assumption that change in social
behavior (particularly change in family law matters) is unidirectional-that
change will always liberalize social rules. Historically, ... this has not been
true."70 And even if behavior and norms are changing in some places, they
may not be in others. As I wrote, "[D]espite the many forces that impel
the United States as a whole toward [social] descensus, there are probably
still states and even regions in which traditional social norms are widely
accepted."71
Finally, even if behavior and norms are changing, society might wish
to alter the direction of change. To be sure, any such attempt might be
problematically overambitious. But there are inherent limits on a govemment' s willingness and ability to make the channeling function work despite
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an inadequate social basis for it. Without that basis, any such effort would
have difficulty garnering the legislative will, the executive energy, or the
popular support necessary to make it work.
In sum, the channeling function's reach is always limited by the degree
of social support the function's institutions receive. Today, marriage and
parenthood appear to be changing institutions, and they appear to be under
more pressure than they have been in recent memory. But this may mean
no more than that these institutions are continuing to develop as they have
been developing for centuries. That they are developing does not mean
that their normative core will disappear. And even if it does, it seems
likely that new institutions will have been created, so that the channeling
function continues to do its work. In short, I doubt that so far, at least, the
American family has become so deinstitutionalized that the channeling function is no longer useful or relevant to family law and thus to state-interest
analysis. But this does not mean, of course, that every use of the function
is constitutionally justifiable. What is needed, rather, is to ask case by case
whether the channeling function can plausibly be said to work effectively.
A second limitation of the channeling function is that its technique
of promoting one institution by disadvantaging the alternatives can be troubling. Where the alternative is immoral and socially harmful, this concern
is, to be sure, much tempered. Originally many alternative institutionspolygamy, adultery, fornication, and homosexuality, for instance-were generally condemned on these grounds. Thus it was considered fair not just
to disadvantage them, but to criminalize them. As views on at least some
of those subjects have changed, that response looks less satisfactory. But
the problem is broader. Even if unmarried cohabitation, for example, is
immoral, should it be discouraged by denying its practitioners the law's
services in resolving their disputes? Doing so may in practice allow one
miscreant actually to profit by taking advantage of another. And in at least
one situation-illegitimacy-those who suffered most from the channeling
function's operation-illegitimate children-were also those who were morally blameless.
In thinking about this second limitation on the channeling function,
we need to consider its complexity: Some ways of making an alternative
institution less attractive are maximally coercive, as when they invoke criminal sanctions; others will hardly be coercive at all, as when they simply
withhold the state's expression of approval. The costs of the technique
importantly depend on the degree of coercion it employs. A sharp example
of the more coercive end of the spectrum is prohibiting homosexual conduct.
Such a prohibition not only invokes the law's strongest weapon-the criminal law. It also tends to exclude homosexuals from what the twentieth
century considers a preeminent part of life-sexual relations.
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On the other hand, ending the practice of disadvantaging competing
institutions altogether would have its own costs. The channeling function
helps tell the people involved in an institution, the world in general, and
the law in particular that those people stand in a particular relation to each
other. When people marry, they, the world, and the law know that they
have assumed special obligations to each other. When a child is born in
wedlock, the parents, the child (eventually), the world, and the law know
that the parents have taken on special responsibilities to their child. "Functional equivalence" approaches serve this end less well.
Consider Marvin. Even had the legal principles established there already been undoubted law in California, Lee Marvin and Michelle Triola
might still not have realized that their relationship had become so marriagelike that they risked legal consequences when they separated. Nor could
courts have known whether Marvin and Triola desired those consequences
or whether they were, as Marvin claimed, trying to avoid them by not
marrying. For the law to treat Marvin and Triola as a family, then, it had
to inquire into their particular case. Each such inquiry has its social costs;
together those costs may be nontrivial. Those costs are not only economic,
although they are that too. For example, inquiries may intrude painfully
into a couple's privacy, as Marvin indicates. First, Marvin requires courts
to ask whether sexual relations are a severable part of the contractual consideration. Second, it mandates a "searching inquiry" into whether the parties
tried to avoid a marital relationship. Third, it demands a factual investigation
into whether there was an express contract, an implied contract, a partnership, a joint venture, or some other kind of understanding. Channeling
institutions, then, set bright lines that establish for all concerned what people's status is. They make it easier for people to predict the consequences
of their acts. Further, they protect people from intrusive governmental inquiries.
Like our discussion of the channeling function's first limitation, our
discussion of the second must reach an equivocal conclusion. The technique
of advantaging favored institutions ranges from hardly troubling to quite
problematic, depending on the nature of behavior in the alternative institution and on how coercive the government's advantaging technique is. Once
again, therefore, a case-by-case inquiry seems called for.
Channeling's costs might more confidently be paid if its success could
be better measured. But a third limitation on the function is the frustrating
difficulty of such measurement. It is always hard to separate out either the
law's effects on an institution from other effects on it or an institution's
effects on behavior from all the other influences people respond to. We
also need to know just what aspects of an institution have precisely what
effects, so that we can rescue a defective institution with judicious changes
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without junking its desirable aspects. Even could these measurement problems be overcome, we should still want to know what effects alternative
institutions might have, and even crude evidence about them will often be
elusive. And even if all these measurements could be made, how would
we evaluate them? All significant social institutions are complex, all have
defects, none wholly accomplish their goals. What standards should we
use in choosing among imperfect institutions?
The difficulty of measuring the channeling function's success in general
or in any particular case is undeniable. But should it constitutionally preclude the state from pursuing the channeling function? That function seeks
to accomplish a complex set of broad social purposes, not simply to prevent
one obvious harm to an identifiable person. Any such attempt will resist
measurement. But that difficulty arises partly out of the very importance
and ambition of the attempt. It seems perverse to say that the only interests
the state may constitutionally advance for a statute are those so narrow
that their effects may be accurately measured. No doubt the channeling
function relies on unprovable assumptions. But "all schemes of statutory
regulation are ultimately based on unprovable assumptions about human
nature."72 Thus I would argue that the channeling function ought not be
dismissed out of hand because measurement is difficult. Here once again,
rather, the function needs to be evaluated case by case.
Fourth, and crucially, channeling's worth in any particular instance
will depend on the specific institutions it supports. Even if an institution
serves the function's ends well, it must be evaluated in terms of all its
social consequences. The law has supported institutions-pejoratively described as the bourgeois family-which have hardly been universally admired over the last two centuries. In the nineteenth century the family was
assailed as a prison by the Romantics and as an instrument of oppression
by the Marxists. Today, it faces similar charges from the psychological
left and from feminists. If those charges are correct, the law's channeling
power was and is, pro tanto, badly used.
Channeling can surely be misused, and people can reasonably disagree
about what "misuse" means. However, this is not a reason for abandoning
the function. For all the function's uncertainties and inadequacies, the goals
it can be used to promote are important. Furthermore, the goals I have
discussed are not the only ones channeling can promote. Channeling is
not inherently confined to any single set of social ends. Rather, it may be
recruited to serve whatever ends seem appropriate.
For example, over the last several decades we have seen systematic
and ambitious attempts to restructure marriage and parenthood in order to
change the way people think and act regarding gender. Susan Okin, for
example, urges channeling in this way by noting that the "way we divide
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the labor and responsibilities in our personal lives seems to be one of those
things that people should be free to work out for themselves, but because
of its vast repercussions it belongs clearly within the scope of things that
must be governed by principles of justice." She continues by arguing that
"any just and fair solution to the urgent problem of women's and children's
vulnerability must encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by men and
women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproductive labor.
We must work toward a future in which all will be likely to choose this
mode of life. " 73
Many recent reforms of family law-made and proposed--can be understood in terms of a desire to employ the channeling function, to change
the institutional basis of family life, in order to change gender relations
in American society. For instance, no-fault divorce can be seen as freeing
women from the bondage of unsatisfactory marriages. It has been hoped
that equitable distribution can lead to a fairer distribution of marital assets
than the common-law system of awarding property to the titleholder, partly
on the reasoning that the titleholder is likelier to be the husband than the
wife. Similarly, the category of assets divisible on divorce has been expanded to include (in various ways) forms of wealth like pensions and
professional degrees. Rehabilitative alimony has found favor over permanent
alimony partly on the principle that the latter conduces to an undesirable
dependence of women on men. Gender-neutral rules governing child custody have been urged in part on the ground that they can help establish
the sense that fathers share with mothers responsibility for the daily care
of their children. The Supreme Court has condemned gender roles in a
variety of instances, saying that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely
for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the
marketplace and the world of ideas."74 Not only has abortion become a
right, but the Court has ruled that that right is expressly a woman's, not
a right she shares with her husband. Rules exempting husbands from the
purview of rape laws have been eroded. Spouse abuse has begun to be
prosecuted more vigorously. Antidiscrimination and affirmative-action rules
have helped open jobs outside the home to women. Even the title by which
married woman are addressed has been widely changed with a view to
changing the way married woman are thought of and think of themselves.
The reforms I have recited have had a variety of goals. Many of those
goals are straightforward enough and have to do with directly ameliorating
the condition of women in particular contexts. But a central purpose of
these reforms can be understood to be altering the institutional situation
in which men and women find themselves. I suspect that doing so is crucial
if the larger goals that reformers ultimately want to reach are to be achieved.
Those goals-which Okin describes as changing the "way we divide the
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labor and responsibilities in our personal lives"-cannot readily be reached
through direct legislation. Rather, social institutions must be structured so
that "all will be likely to choose this mode of life."
As I have tried to make clear, I have no doubt that the channeling
function can be misused deplorably. But this essay has been animated in
part by the belief that, at least among my likely readers, the faults of
institutions have in recent decades received so much attention that their
advantages are too little noted. It is worth recalling that we value institutions
because they can promote goods that the state may legitimately prefer and
promote. As I have suggested, the channeling function can be used to serve
the (widely approved) protective, arbitral, and facilitative functions of family
law. And as I have argued at some length, social institutions serve other
functions that cannot easily be otherwise performed. 75
Some of my readers will feel that the channeling function is objectionable because its effects must be systematically conservative. Leaving aside
the question whether this is a legitimate constitutional objection, we may
agree that there is something in the argument that social institutions are
inherently conservative. Social institutions rest on attitudes that resist change
because they are deeply ingrained and widely shared.76 However, this does
not seem to me wholly bad, for reasons I have tried to suggest. Be that
as it may, while social institutions may in important ways be inherently
conservative, it would be wrong to see the channeling function in the same
light. On the contrary, one of the most significant aspects of the function
is exactly its reforming capacity. Because of their social strength, social
institutions can be hard to change. There are few levers any person or
even groups can press to exert real power directly on many institutions.
The government, however, is specially-perhaps uniquely-well situated
to try to change institutions that have come to seem unsatisfactory. 77 As I
wrote above, the channeling function may be and often is used to shape
as well as sustain social institutions.
In any event, in an important sense, one cannot abolish the channeling
function in family law. Family law's goals-particularly those goals represented by the protective, arbitral, and facilitative functions-are so central
that they are unlikely to be abandoned. As long as we pursue those goals,
we will be creating, building on, and shaping social institutions and channeling people into them. The most obvious way to try to escape doing so is
by expanding the facilitative function, by turning family law into contract
law. That venture could not entirely succeed, of course, if only because
family law centrally involves children, and children (particularly the young
children about whom we worry most) cannot make contracts. But even if
the venture succeeded, it would create a new institution. Contract, after
all, has its own social structures, its own assumptions, its own consequences.
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Indeed, these are at the heart of the resistance to contract law's incursion
into the sphere of family life.
Channeling, then, cannot be escaped. It arises because we are social
beings whose relations with those around us shape institutions that in turn
shape us. It arises because we are imperfect people who without institutions
behave in ways that injure our fellows. 78 It arises because we see the faults
of the institutions around us and seek to perfect them. Channeling, like
any social tool, may be and has been used badly and used to bad purposes.
But it is also one of the ways we try to use law to soften the harshness
of life.
Case Study: Michael H. v. Gerald D.

I suggested at the beginning of this essay that courts and commentators
have often been led astray by their failure to appreciate the way the law
may be used to shape and sustain social institutions. I will now seek to
instantiate that argument and to make my description of the channeling
function more concrete by discussing a recent (and doctrinally consequential) case, the Supreme Court's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D, a case
I have chosen partly because many people find its state-interest aspect incomprehensible. 79
In 1976, Gerald D. ("a top executive in a French oil company") married
Carole D. ("an international model"). 80 In 1978, "Carole became involved
in an adulterous affair with a neighbor, Michael H." In 1981, she had a
child, Victoria D. "Gerald was listed as father on the birth certificate and
has always held Victoria out to the world as his daughter." However, a
blood test soon revealed "a 98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's
father."
During the next three years, Victoria stayed with Carole, but Carole
moved among the households of Gerald, Michael, and "yet another man,
Scott K." We cannot tell just how much contact Michael had with Victoria
during this period. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion speaks of "the relationship established between a married woman, her lover and their child, during
a three-month sojourn in St. Thomas, [and] during a subsequent 8-month
period when, if he happened to be in Los Angeles, he stayed with her and
the child."81 Justice Brennan's dissent said, "[T]he evidence is undisputed
that Michael, Victoria, and Carole did live together as a family; that is,
they shared the same household, Victoria called Michael 'Daddy,' Michael
contributed to Victoria's support, and he is eager to continue his relationship
with her." 82
So eager was Michael that he "filed a filiation action ... to establish
his paternity and right to visitation." To cut a long and tumultuous story
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short, "In June 1984, Carole reconciled with Gerald and joined him in New
York, where they now live with Victoria and two other children since born
into the marriage." Michael's filiation action encountered a California statute
providing "that 'the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is
not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.' ... The presumption may be rebutted by blood tests, but only if a
motion for such tests is made, within two years from the date of the child's
birth, either by the husband or, if the natural father has filed an affidavit
acknowledging paternity, by the wife."83 In 1985 the trial court rejected
Michael's claim; in 1987 an appellate court affirmed and the California
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In 1989 (when Victoria was roughly eight), the United States Supreme
Court found the California statute constitutional. Michael, of course, had
claimed a fundamental right to a relationship with Victoria and that the
statute that barred his filiation action therefore had to be necessary to serve
a compelling state interest. The plurality held that he had no such right,
and it therefore did not reach the state-interest problem.84 Justice Brennan
felt that Michael had such a right and therefore did reach that problem,
but only dismissively. 85 We, however, should find it useful to ask how the
state's interests would look in light of the channeling function.
In channeling terms, the state in Michael H. could be said to have
two related "institutional" interests: first, an interest in preserving the stability of marriage in general and the marriage between Gerald and Carole in
particular. Second, an interest in the security of parenthood in general and
of the relationship between Victoria and her presumptive parents in particular. Both these interests might be reasonably adduced in arguing against
allowing Michael either parental rights or a hearing.
A state exercising the channeling function may seek to strengthen the
bond between husbands and wives, to promote the strength and stability
of marriages. The constitutional legitimacy of that aim seems confirmed
by the many cases praising a couple's constitutional interest in marriage.
The state might well conclude that it would damage such relationships to
require a couple to litigate with an outsider over the paternity of a child
born to the wife during the marriage and to issue an official governmental
announcement that that child was the wife's but not the husband's. The
damage might come from several sources. If the husband did not know
of his wife's affair and that "his" child was not his, he might feel the
sharpest kind of pain. His reaction might be bitter and recriminating. The
child might be a constant reminder of his wife's infidelity. It would hardly
be surprising for him to contemplate divorce.
Even if the husband al~eady knew of his wife's affair, their marriage
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might still be banned by the kind of inquiry Michael sought. What couple
would welcome such attention to their marriage and to the husband's cuckolded status? A core argument against fault-based divorce and applicable
here is that couples ought not have to make a public display of their private
lives. Even if devices like concealing the parties' names were used, spouses
would still reveal themselves to everyone participating in the case. Quite
apart from the injury to privacy, all litigation brings misery, and litigation
over personal, especially intimate, subjects brings it abundantly. Such misery is unlikely to enhance the couple's marriage. Nor would it help to place
the wife in the extremely awkward situation of recounting her betrayal of
her marital· 1oyalties. And a judicial inquiry would commonly come at the
worst time-when the affair had recently ended, the wife had returned to
her husband, and they were trying to reconstruct their marriage and their
family life. Nor is it easy to believe that, where the natural father won
visitation rights, the couple's marriage would benefit from having to share
childrearing with the wife's former lover.
The California rule has several other attractions. An abandoned lover
might be bitter, and the rule protects the reunited couple against merely
malicious (even if factually well-founded) suits by a vengeful lover. And,
of course, the lover's allegation might be false. The rule protects couples
from having to resist such accusations. Finally, there would always be a
small (roughly two percent) but not irrelevant chance that the blood test
was inaccurate.
A state using the channeling function may also want children to be
raised in a stable home by two adults, each of whom is preferably the
child's parent. Such a state might conclude that a child in Victoria's situation should have two parents who are fully and reliably hers. She cannot
live with her two natural parents, but she has a natural mother who is
married and that mother's husband is apparently willing to care and has
been caring for her. The state might conclude from the social experience
with children of divorce that, while it can be hard to be raised by two
people on difficult terms who do not live together, it would be even worse
to be brought up by three people, two of whom (the two men) have reason
to be on hostile terms, two of whom (the mother and the lover) have reason
to be on tense terms, and two of whom (the mother and the husband)
have reason to be struggling to maintain a happy relationship.
The dissent in Michael H. would presumably respond that the child's
situation is secure because visitation would be ordered only if that were
in the child's best interest. However, the state might reasonably conclude
that the chances of visitation being in a child's best interests are small
enough to justify a general ban on an inquiry. The state might also believe
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what is often said, that findings about best interest are uncertain enough
to make it wise to avoid such decisions when there are otherwise strong
reasons for doing so. 86
Further, Victoria's well-being and her relationship with Gerald and
Carole, like their relationship with each other, might well be injured simply
from having to endure a hearing. Like her parents, she has a privacy interest
in avoiding the scrutiny a hearing is likely to inflict and an interest in
escaping the misery of litigation. Further, the ability of Victoria's caretakers
to be good parents and to maintain an untroubled relationship with her is
likely to be injured by a hearing which so basically questioned the relationships of everyone involved. 87 Finally, until the hearing is concluded (and
this litigation lasted something like seven years), the child would not know
the status of her various parents. This is a kind (and length) of instability
that is now widely deplored. 88
In sum, California's rule can be seen as buttressing two institutions:
a version of marriage and a view of parenthood. It does so by affecting
entry into the latter institution, by refusing legal effect to some ways of
entering parenthood. And it does so by restricting the forces that can impinge on participants in both institutions. Finally, the rule may reaffirm in
people's minds the social importance of marriage and its relationship with
parenthood.
Not atypically, the channeling function operates here by disadvantaging
the "alternative institution" that Michael sought to create. It denied him
the consolation of legally enforced contact with his child. I said earlier
that this technique can be problematic. Is it here?
Michael knew when he had the affair with Carole that she was married,
and, given the operation of the channeling function and the social assumptions on which it relied, he knew that people commonly lack legal or even
social rights in their married lovers' children. Further, the California statute
put him on constructive notice that any child he had with Carole would
legally be considered a child of her marriage (unless one spouse repudiated
the child). More, the child was conceived in an adulterous relationship, a
relationship Justices have said in dictum the state may make criminal. Finally, Michael probably knew that asserting a claim to the child could
harm the marriage he had already damaged. If expectation has anything
to do with parental rights, as the Court sometimes seems to say, and if his
moral situation is as I have suggested, his claim to parental status does
not look strong.
Is all this enough to overcome whatever constitutional rights Michael
can assert? Since I share the plurality's skepticism about those rights, and
since I find the Court's state-interests tests too mysterious to apply intelligibly,89 I cannot say. Nor have I considered other interests the state might
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assert.9() But I do think that the channeling arguments are serious ones
that should be among the factors weighed in any balancing of personal
rights and state interests.
Conclusion

This essay argues that the Court has undervalued state interests in privacy
cases. It suggests that the state's interests are richer, subtler, and more
complex than the Court credits, and that statutes must be seen in light of
their full legal and social context. This article has proposed that the state
has an interest in helping to assure the existence of some kinds of social
institutions and in helping to shape those institutions in beneficial ways.
That interest will not always be present in a privacy case, it will not always
be well served by a challenged statute, and it will not always be strong
enough to overcome a claimant's right. But it can be part of what motivates
states to adopt legislation and part of what justifies it.
It may be that state-interest analysis as conventionally understood cannot accommodate the channeling function. That would seem to me to reinforce the point with which I began this paper-that that analysis has
been inadequate to its task. We hear a good deal about the Supreme Court's
role as the country's conscience and about the indispensable "dialogue"
over national issues that the Court is thought to conduct. But a wise conscience and a full dialogue will accord all aspects of an issue their due.
This conventional state-interest analysis has failed to do.
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